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In From Biopolitics to Mindpolitics Marc Schuilenburg and Rik Peters 
explore how 'nudging' as a technique to alter people's behaviour works in 
social fields and how it is embedded in our environment. They ask what 
nudging means in terms of Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics. This essay is part 
of Culture of Control [onlineopen.org/article.php?id=492]
, a collaboration with Stroom Den Haag.
Introduction
Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics has become one of the boom concepts of our time. 
Foucault (1976) defined biopolitics as a modern form of power starting from the 
eighteenth century that is exercised at the level of life through control of the population.1
One of the keys to this power over life is the training of the body, through a systematic 
standardisation of actions over time, and through the control of space. Despite the fact 
that the use of the term “biopolitics” in Foucault’s work remains largely limited to the 
period 1976–1978, there is an ongoing interest in the way the appearance of the population 
on the political stage is linked to the advent of new techniques in which governments 
tackle their problems with the “usual suspects”, such as the high-risk or high-rate 
offenders and the not-integrated elements of society. Although these studies on our 
culture of control reveal a great deal about the disciplinary and normalising effects on 
individuals, a deeper and more critical understanding of biopolitics is necessary.
We claim that Foucault’s turn towards a critique of political economy in his lectures on 
The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) is precisely what is missing from contemporary, post-
Foucaultian accounts of biopolitics. Key to these lectures is the idea that the neoliberal 
program seeks to create neither “a disciplinary society” nor a “society of control” (Deleuze, 
1995), but instead a society that cultivates and optimises differences by using “new 
techniques of environmental technology or environmental psychology” (Foucault, 2008: 
259). Unfortunately, Foucault does not elaborate on the question of which behavioural 
techniques are used to manage or govern citizens by “systematically modifying the 
variables of the environment” (2008: 270–71). As a consequence, it remains unclear (1) 
which techniques are embedded in our environment to manage individual behaviour in the 
social realm and (2) what these techniques mean in terms of Foucault’s analysis of 
biopolitics.
The concept of “nudge” provides a useful insight here. Nudging has gained widespread 
recognition through the work of behavioural economist Richard Thaler and law scholar 
Cass Sunstein, who see nudging as a technique to alter people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. In order to get a better understanding how nudging works, we consider recent 
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examples of nudging in the field of safety and security management. We conclude that 
nudging should be understood as a new version of biopolitics, albeit with one crucial 
difference: instead of working upon the individual body or populations in general, nudging 
is a form of “mind-politics”, which works upon the psychological triggers underlying 
human behaviour and choice.
“We have been nudged”
Thaler and Sunstein state in their book Nudge (2009; Sunstein, 2014) that nudging is 
about influencing people’s behaviour so that they will lead longer and healthier lives 
(“paternalistic aspect”) while, at the same time, people should be free to do what they like 
(“libertarian aspect”). This “soft paternalism” is backed by the “publicity principle” of John 
Rawls, which, in its simplest form, bans government from selecting a policy that is not in 
accordance with principles that one would be willing as a rational being to enact as law for 
everyone. In order to comprehend the rationalities of the technique of nudging more 
succinctly, it is possible to reconstruct it in terms of the triangle of “power-knowledge-
subject”.
First of all, the operationalisation of nudging requires interventions in the choice 
architecture (the physical, socio-cultural and administrative environment) in which people 
live out their lives and make decisions. The concept of “script”, as elaborated by Madeleine 
Akrich and Bruno Latour (1992), is helpful in understanding the way the choice architect, 
who is called upon to be the agent of design-led change of people’s behaviour, anticipates 
how users will interact with their environment. A script is not just the set of directions to 
be used, it is rather the “built-ins” of “prescriptions” that impose themselves on the user: 
inviting one choice of action over another. A speed bump, for example, has the script “slow 
down when you approach me”. It translates a driver’s intention from “driving fast, because 
I’m in a hurry” to “driving slowly to save my shock absorbers” (Verbeek, 2006: 58). But, 
although it encourages drivers to reduce their speed, this type of script is not absolute: it 
leaves room for other options.
In addition, nudging departs from the idea that a “positive, injunctive norm is more 
effective than the negative, informational one” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 68). Especially 
for choices that have delayed effects; those that are difficult, infrequent, and offer poor 
feedback; and those for which the relation between choice and experience is ambiguous, 
people will need, “good nudges”. The question is whether it is possible to decide when 
people will eat better, invest more wisely, and choose better. Pelle Hansen and Andreas 
Jespersen (2013) argue that Thaler’s and Sunstein’s appeal to Rawls’s publicity principle is 
insufficient as a safeguard against non-legit state manipulation of the people’s choice. 
Part of the problem of nudging is that it is extremely difficult for citizens to reconstruct 
either the intention or the means by which behavioural change is pursued.
Finally, nudging is critical to the homo economicus view of human beings in the standard 
economic framework. The fundamental assumption of classic economic theory that 
people are able to identify and choose what is best for them, when provided with accurate 
information about their circumstances, is seen as a false assumption. People fail to choose 
optimally, either because they immediately overstate in terms of the long-term prospects, 
develop all kinds of harmful habits or they copy the behaviour of others in their social 
group, even if this behaviour is detrimental to their health or safety. Against this 
background, one of the most important aspects of nudging is that it invokes a subject-
image that is based on unambiguous emotions, such as “anger, hatred, guilt, shame, pride, 
liking, regret, joy, grief, envy, malice, indignation, jealousy, contempt, disgust, fear, and, oh 
yes, love” (Thaler, 2000: 139).
Having outlined the rationalities of the technique of nudging, let us now explore how 
nudging works in social fields that have a different background or are embedded in 
different rationalities such as the purely economical. Although there is a growing literature 
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in behavioural economy studies on the advantages of nudging, there still remains the 
question of how nudging is taken up by policymakers to develop mutual strategies in other 
fields, such as in the field of safety and security management. Here we limit our analysis to 
the Netherlands for practical reasons, but we believe our findings will not fundamentally 
differ from developments in other Western countries given the broad academic consensus 
on the current culture of surveillance in crime policy and security management (Garland 
2001; Schuilenburg 2015).
Nudging in safety and security management
In modern Western states, safety and security policies have for a long time been executed 
within the framework of penal law and the police that have to enforce the law. However, as 
social control in families and communities declined and the opportunities for criminal or 
otherwise deviant behaviour increased during the final quarter of the twentieth century, 
governments began to develop alternative means to control the population. The so-called 
“punitive turn”, with its greater intolerance of deviance and deviants and greater support 
for harsher policies and severer punishments, tells only part of the story. In terms of the 
impact on social life in the public domain, the rise of preventative policies and social 
control agendas are at least as influential (Peeters 2013).
What sets these preventative and control policies apart from a more classic punitive 
repertoire is their emphasis on the safety of the public domain and the management of the 
people who freely use this public domain. Government’s interest here is not the reaction to 
individual acts of crime, but the permanent concern for social order, including feelings of 
insecurity among the population. In fact, public safety policies that rely primarily on law 
enforcement are seen as incomplete and insufficient to protect the public (Farrington and 
Tonry 1995). As such, the development of security policies is increasingly characterised by 
instruments that couple the concern for control with the freedom of behaviour – not only 
because Western governments are bound by constitutional constraints in their capacity to 
limit individual freedom, but also (and perhaps mainly) because control is most effective 
when its underlying values are internalised by citizens. These latter nudging techniques 
are the object of our interest here. The reason for this is that they are a more sophisticated 
approach to achieving change in people than traditional methods of law enforcement and 
punishment.
An example of a nudge as seen on highways in the Netherlands, which does not violate the 
“autonomous” character of people’s lives, is the smiley that indicates that drivers are 
driving too fast: It smiles at cars under the speed limit and frowns at cars over the limit. 
This type of nudge is similar to the intervention that tried to provoke drivers to reduce their 
driving speeds by painting a series of white stripes on the roads that are initially evenly 
spaced but get closer together as drivers reach a dangerous curve. This environmental 
design gives the sensation that driving speed is increasing (even while the speed is not 
really changing), which in turn triggers the driver’s natural instinct to slow down. The cost 
of sending such visual signals is close to zero, but the effectiveness is very significant 
according to nudging’s most prominent proponents.
The institutionalising of nudges also takes place in other settings in the Netherlands, such 
as those involving mass private properties. A good example, which stresses positive 
instead of negative incentives, is the controlling of Dutch travellers with a low security risk 
at airports. Once registration has been approved, a chip pass with biometrical data is 
made, which contains both fingerprints and iris scans. This biometric chip pass allows 
travellers to subsequently more easily cross borders without being held up for questioning 
or physical inspections at the airport. This means that citizens voluntarily hand over 
personal data in exchange for access to the “fast track”. In this nudge arrangement, 
control is transformed from an action induced by an exterior agency to hamper the flow 
from outside to a self-induced control mechanism to allow the fastest movement possible 
page: 3 / 7 — From Biopolitics to Mindpolitics onlineopen.org
(Romein and Schuilenburg 2008). Control thus becomes an immanent part of flows. This 
means that surveillance is “designed into”, as Nikolas Rose (2000) called it, the flows of 
everyday existence.
The idea of willingly giving up one’s privacy or freedom in exchange for a reward also 
forms the basis of innovative insurance plans. For instance, a Dutch car insurance 
company has installed a device into a client’s car to track his driving style (speeding, 
accelerating, etc.). Clients with a “safe driving style” are rewarded with a discount on their 
insurance policy. 2 Another example is an insurance company’s policy that gives their 
clients discounts on measures that prevent fire or theft and services that install 
preventative devices. The company offers an extensive range of products in its online shop.
3 A final example of nudging in safety and security management comes from the Dutch 
city of Rotterdam, where a neighbourhood speed limit is enforced by positive financial 
incentives. Each time a car driver sticks to the speed limit, a small amount of money is 
transferred to a fund for neighbourhood improvement. A screen along the road indicates a 
driver’s speed as well as the current level of donations. 4
The most critical comment with respect to these types of nudges is that they seem to 
overlap with well-known techniques of situational crime prevention against violence and 
malicious damage. In fact, the aim of situational crime prevention is to establish 
environmental changes and to reduce the opportunity for unwanted behaviour. However, 
nudging does not seek to directly enforce desirable behaviour. Instead, a web of incentives 
and disincentives is spun around people to manage their behaviour. This moulding of 
conduct is typically dispersed and flows through networks of authorities and professionals 
rather than being executed from a hierarchical centre. As such, these types of techniques 
do not oppose or limit the freedom of individuals, as opposed to many examples of 
situational crime prevention (and disciplinary techniques), but use the freedom of citizens 
as an instrument of penal power (“power to”). This means that individuals adapt their own 
behaviour in response to psychological incentives (“fast track”, “happy face”), which are an 
integral part of the design of public space (“choice architecture”). As such, the choice 
architecture is not an amoral approach, but a deeply normative technique of design that 
aims at creating a better life and society for everyone.
Governing through nudging
In the above discussion, we hope we have shown that nudging is one of the most 
prominent new techniques to govern the conduct of citizens in the context of neoliberal 
societies. According to Thaler and Sunstein, nudging citizens towards responsible 
behaviour is a fitting addition to the intervention repertoire of neoliberal governments. Key 
to this reconfiguration of the self is the idea that people are “nudge-able” and that they 
can be governed from a distance by environmental technology and environmental 
psychology. Nudging allows individuals to choose freely, but also always implies that 
certain behavioural options are made more attractive than others.
What is important here is that nudging is not a technique of juridical power – such as 
criminal law or social rights, which constitute a relationship between state and individual – 
nor is nudging a technique of discipline, which deprives the individual of his or her 
freedom to choose and works through his or her body inside institutions such as prisons, 
factories, asylums and schools. Nudging takes the entire population as its object of 
intervention, seeks to enable individuals to use their freedom, and promotes positive 
values of health, self-efficacy and safety. As a consequence, we argue that nudging should 
be understood as a differentiation of Foucault’s analytic of “biopolitics”, albeit with one 
crucial difference. Instead of working upon the individual body or populations in general, 
the formalisation of conduct and thought works mainly via the architecture of choice. The 
object of intervention is not primarily the individual body, which needs to be controlled and 
trained (“disciplinary power”). Instead, it is the mind that needs to be triggered to make 
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responsible choices.
To avoid any misunderstanding, the focus on the mind does not depend on a false 
Cartesian mind-body dualism by privileging the rational mind over the emotional body. 
The mind-body dualism is an artificial construct rather than an inherent property of the 
individual. At the heart of Foucault’s analysis of power, he sought to transcend a mind-
body dualism by describing the relations between knowledge and power that come to 
constitute subjects in a specific historical context. Nevertheless, the task of current 
research in biopolitics is not simply to describe the eighteenth-century disciplinary and 
regulatory mechanisms but also to reflect on “who we are today”.
To think in terms of biopolitics today means to think of its relation to a world where it is 
increasingly difficult – and undesirable from both an economic and normative perspective 
– to “pin down” individuals in a specific location or institution. Today’s core mechanisms of 
production and competition are mobility and choice (in sharp contrast to the logic of the 
assembly line at industrial factories). The technique of nudging follows these 
transformations in our social ecology by intervening in motion. That is, nudging aims to 
move individuals in a certain direction or to make certain choices whilst not restraining 
their physical mobility or freedom of choice. As a result, the future seems to lie in, what we 
call, a form of “mindpolitics”. Mindpolitics is the management of the population by 
working upon the psychological triggers underlying human behaviour and choice in order 
to produce healthier and safer lives.
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Footnotes
1. The term first appears in a lecture entitled “The Birth of Social 
Medicine” that Foucault presented at the University of Rio de Janeiro 
in October 1974. The concept subsequently returned in  The Will to 
Knowledge, the first part of The History of Sexuality , and in the lecture 
series Society Must Be Defended, both of which date from 1976, in 
which Foucault connects the concept with the conditions under which 
people live and the way in which their body functions as a bearer of 
biological processes. Finally, the theme is covered in his lecture series 
Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics at the 
Collège de France from 11 January 1978 to 4 April 1979.
2. www.fairzekering.nl.
3. www.interpolispreventiewinkel.nl .
4. www.ad.nl.
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